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Abstract
The Gibbs paradox has frequently been interpreted as a sign that
particles of the same kind are fundamentally indistinguishable; and
that quantum mechanics, with its identical fermions and bosons, is
indispensable for making sense of this. In this article we shall ar-
gue, on the contrary, that analysis of the paradox supports the idea
that classical particles are always distinguishable. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, this analysis extends to quantum mechanics: even according to
quantum mechanics there can be distinguishable particles of the same
kind. Our most important general conclusion will accordingly be that
the universally accepted notion that quantum particles of the same
kind are necessarily indistinguishable rests on a confusion about how
particles are represented in quantum theory.
1 Introduction: The Gibbs Paradox
Imagine the following experimental set-up: a partition divides a container
into two equal parts, each containing a different ideal gas—the amounts of
gas, pressure and temperature being equal in the two halves of the container.
Now, the partition is suddenly removed, so that the two gases start mixing
via an irreversible process; eventually a macroscopic equilibrium situation is
established. The uniform gas mixture that fills the container at the end of
this process then possesses a higher entropy than the total entropy of the gas
system we started with; the difference is the entropy of mixing.
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The magnitude of this entropy increase can be calculated by considering
a reversible process that begins in the same unmixed situation and ends in
the same final equilibrium state as the irreversible process we just described.
The standard (theoretical) way of realizing this reversible mixing process
makes use of semi-permeable membranes: the partition between the two
halves of the container is replaced (in thought) by two membranes, one only
transparent to the gas on the left-hand side (gas A, say), the other only
transparent to the other gas (B). These membranes can now be slowly
shifted to the left and the right wall of the container, respectively, thereby
letting gases A and B expand reversibly. During this process each of the
expanding gases exerts a pressure P on the membrane that is opaque to it,
so work is done. In order to keep the energy and the temperature at their
original values a compensating amount of heat, 4Q, should therefore be
supplied to the gases, and this can be arranged by immersing the system in
a heat bath. The change of entropy resulting from this reversible process can
be calculated via 4S = ∫ dQ/T , with T the temperature. The added heat,
dQ, should equal the work performed by the two gases, i.e. 2PdV . In this
way we find:
4S = 2
∫
PdV/T = 2
∫
kNdV/V = 2kN log 2, (1)
where we have used the ideal gas law PV = kNT , with N the number of
atoms or molecules in each of the two gases and k Boltzmann’s constant.
This entropy of mixing is independent of the exact physical properties
of gases A and B. The only thing that plays a role in the calculation and
in the final result is that the two gases are different. This difference makes
it possible to design—in principle—the semi-permeable membranes that are
needed for the reversible mixing process. If the gases are the same no dis-
tinguishing membranes can exist and there is no mixing at all according
to thermodynamics: from a thermodynamic point of view nothing happens
when the partition is removed in this case.
As a consequence, there is a discontinuity in the behavior of the entropy:
any difference between the gases, however small, produces the same mixing
entropy 2kN log 2, whereas there is no entropy of mixing if the gases are the
same. The existence of this discontinuity is known as the Gibbs paradox.
Within the framework of thermodynamics the modern standard response
[8] to the existence of this discontinuity is that nothing remarkable is hap-
pening here: In principle (although not in practice) it is always possible to
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design membranes that distinguish gases A and B as long as there is any
difference between them at all. Because there is no conceptual difficulty
in accepting a discontinuity between “A and B differ” and “A and B are
equal”, it should not be considered paradoxical that there is a correspond-
ing discontinuity between distinguishability-in-principle plus existence of a
mixing entropy, and complete identity without such an entropy. Moreover,
in practical situations the effectiveness of distinguishing between two gases
will be restricted by technical limitations—this effectiveness will gradually
diminish when the two gases become more similar. As a consequence, no dis-
continuity will be detectable in actual laboratory situations: the measured
mixing entropy will there vanish continuously. It is only in the idealized sit-
uation of perfectly effective separation techniques that the discontinuity in
the entropy will manifest itself—and as we have seen, in this case there is no
conceptual problem.
2 The Gibbs Paradox in Statistical Mechan-
ics
The paradox can also be formulated in statistical mechanics. In statistical
mechanics a counterpart to the thermodynamical entropy is defined, namely
the logarithm of the number of microstates W that are compatible with a
given macrostate: S = k logW . When an ideal gas of N particles expands
and doubles its volume, the number of available microstates X per particle
doubles: each particle now obtains twice as much space available to it as
it had before. This means that W goes up, from XN to (2X)N , which
corresponds to an entropy difference 4S = kN log 2. When two different
ideal gases mix, the statistical mechanical entropy of mixing is therefore
2kN log 2, exactly the value predicted by thermodynamics.
When two equal volumes of the same gas mix, the number of microstates
available to an arbitrary individual particle still doubles, so the formula S =
k logW gives us 4S = 2kN log 2, as before. But now this result seems
wrong, at least from the point of view of thermodynamics. As we have seen,
the thermodynamical entropy of mixing vanishes in this case, because nothing
happens when two identical gases mix. This then leads to a new form of the
Gibbs paradox: the statistical mechanical entropy of mixing is insensitive to
the question of whether the gases are equal or unequal, but this is in conflict
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with the discontinuity predicted by thermodynamics.
In the literature the following argument is often deployed in order to
remove this discrepancy. “Since the molecules (or atoms) of a given species
of gas are all qualitatively the same, permutations of these particles do not
have any physical effect and do not lead to a new state; therefore, replace
W by W/N ! in the formula for the entropy.” As it turns out, this change in
the way of counting the number of available microstates suffices to restore
agreement with thermodynamics.
Indeed, the division by N ! makes the mixing entropy in the equal-gases-
case disappear and leaves the other, correct results untouched. For example,
doubling of the volume of a gas without a change in the number of particles
gives us 4S = kN(logXN/N ! − log(2X)N/N !) = kN log 2, so the entropy
of mixing keeps its appropriate value in the case of two different gases that
mix. However, doubling the volume together with doubling N gives us,
via Stirling’s formula, that the number of microstates goes from W to W 2:
W = XN/N ! → W ′ = (2X)2N/(2N)! = W 2. This implies, via S = k logW ,
that the entropy just doubles, without entropy of mixing, when two volumes
of equal gases are combined.
The way in which the division by (2N)! in the equal-gases-case achieves
the removal of the mixing entropy is that it throws away, in addition to the
exchanges among left particles and right particles, also all permutations in
which one or more particles coming from the left are exchanged with particles
originating from the right side of the container. This now discarded number of
permutations yields a factorM = (2N)!/N !N ! in the number of microstates,
which via 4S = k logM corresponds exactly to the value of the entropy of
mixing. In other words, there no longer can be any mixing, nor any entropy
of mixing, because the exchange of a particle from the left with one from the
right is defined away, as not giving rise to a new physical situation.
The division by N ! thus restores the situation as we know it from ther-
modynamics: there is a finite and constant entropy of mixing in the case of
different gases, however small the difference between the gases may be, and
there is no such entropy in the case of equal gases.
However, this result is achieved at the price of defining away differences
that obviously are physically real, at least from the point of view of classical
physics. Indeed, classical particles are the example par excellence of distin-
guishable individuals: no two classical particles can be in exactly the same
physical state because they will at any instant at least occupy different spa-
tial positions, by virtue of their impenetrability. Moreover, classical particles
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follow continuous and non-intersecting trajectories, so that they “remember”
where they came from. Their individuality and distinguishability are thus
preserved over time, with the consequence that it makes a physical differ-
ence, in principle, whether a given particle in our gas container originates
from the left or from the right. So the above resolution of the Gibbs paradox
in statistical mechanics, relying as it does on an assumed identity of states
that follow from each other by particle permutations, is in conflict with basic
features of classical mechanics. It is for this reason that quantum mechanics
is often invoked: in quantum mechanics particles are indistinguishable as a
matter of principle, so that particle exchanges really do not alter the physical
state—at least, that is the conventional wisdom.
However, as we shall show in a moment, the starting point of the whole
argument, namely that there should be no statistical mechanical entropy of
mixing in the case of two gases of the same kind, is shaky. Although on the
macroscopic, thermodynamical level the absence of an effect of mixing two
equal gases is certainly a justified assumption, this does not mean that there
are no effects if microscopic details are taken into account.
3 The Statistical Mechanical Entropy of Mix-
ing
We are now going to argue in the context of statistical mechanics, and this
induces us to consider a slight extension of the tools that are used in ther-
modynamical thought experiments. In statistical mechanics the motivating
idea is to take into account how gases are built up from their atoms or
molecules, and this makes it natural to consider a variation on the reversible
mixing process explained in section 1. In section 1 an essential role was
played by semi-permeable membranes that were only transparent to one of
the two gases (in the case of the mixing of different gases). In the context
of thermodynamics this means that the membranes are sensitive to chemical
differences between the gases. In statistical mechanics we have the opportu-
nity to generalize this and to consider membranes that are also sensitive to
microscopic particle details. In this spirit we now introduce a new type of
semi-permeable membrane: one that is transparent to particles originating
on the right-hand side of the container and opaque to particles coming from
the left-hand halve (or vice versa). According to classical physics such mem-
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branes are possible in principle, as is clear from what was said above about
particle properties in classical mechanics: particles carry the data about their
origin with them, in their position and momentum values, and this can (in
principle) be used to determine whether the membrane should stop them
or not. Figuratively speaking, think of submicroscopic computers built into
the membrane that perform an ultra-rapid calculation each time a particle
hits them, to see where it came from; or the proverbial demon with super-
human calculational powers who stops or lets pass particles depending on
their origin. In general, of course, allowing expedients of this kind may upset
thermodynamical principles, in particular the second law of thermodynam-
ics. But in the thought experiment we propose here we make a restricted
use of these unusual membranes. The idea is merely to employ them for the
purpose of demonstrating that if gases are mixed and unmixed by selection
on the basis of past particle trajectories and origins, as should be possible
according to classical mechanics, this leads to the emergence of an entropy
of mixing.
Indeed, if we use semi-permeable membranes designed in the way just
described, and employ them exactly as our earlier membranes but now in the
case of two gases of the same kind, we find just as before that a pressure is
exerted on the membranes by the particles to which they are not transparent.
Copying the reasoning from section 1, we can conclude that this leads to
the presence of an entropy of mixing with the value 2kN log 2. In other
words, if the submicroscopic particle picture of statistical mechanics is taken
completely seriously, the original formula S = k logW , without the ad-hoc
division by N !, gives us correct results.
In principle then, on the microscopic level of description the mixing en-
tropy always exists according to classical mechanics, even in the case of equal
gases. In principle, classical particles can always be distinguished on the ba-
sis of their trajectories and there is a corresponding mixing entropy that can
be measured by using semi-permeable membrane-like devices of the kind we
have described. Classical atoms and molecules are distinguishable individual
entities, and we can conclude that analysis of the Gibbs paradox supports
rather than undermines this general feature of classical physics. Of course,
microscopic distinguishability cannot show up if we confine ourselves to using
macroscopic separation techniques of the kind considered in thermodynamics.
But this is a practical matter that should not be confused with an argument
for fundamental indistinguishability on the particle level.
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4 A New Dilemma: The Gibbs Paradox in
Quantum Mechanics
But now we are facing a new paradox. In quantum mechanics the “identity
of indistinguishable particles” has long been recognized as a basic principle,
given concrete form by the (anti-)symmetrization postulates. These postu-
lates stipulate that in the case of particles of the same kind permutations
of particle indices leave a many-particle state either invariant (the case of
bosons) or change its sign (the case of fermions); in either case there are
no measurable physical differences associated with the permutations. These
symmetrization postulates possess a law-like validity, so they hold regardless
of the peculiarities of the situation that is considered. Therefore, from the
quantum mechanical point of view division by N ! seems completely justified
and even mandatory when the number of microstates has to be determined.
Application of S = k logW then seems to tell us that as a matter of principle
there can be no entropy of mixing when two gases of the same kind mix—as
we have seen above, the division by N ! leads immediately to this conclusion.
This is a paradox. A treatment of the mixing of gases by means of
quantum mechanics should obviously reproduce the results of a classical cal-
culation in the classical limiting situation, so it should be able to yield the
value 2kN log 2 in the case in which we follow individual particle trajecto-
ries, as described in the previous section. But it now seems that according
to quantum mechanics this is impossible in principle!
To put the difficulty into perspective, consider a situation that is possible
according to quantum mechanics and at the same time can be dealt with
by classical mechanics. Suppose that the one-particle states occurring in the
quantum mechanical many-particles wavefunction of our ideal gas system do
not overlap spatially, and that this remains true for a substantive time in-
terval. Well-known results (in particular Ehrenfest’s theorem, to which we
shall return in section 5) assure us that in this case the spatially isolated
one-particle quantum wave packets behave exactly like classical particles. In
fact, what we have here is the quantum mechanical description of a diluted
ideal gas, and this description is virtually identical to what classical theory
tells us: small one-particle wave packets take the place of classical particles,
are subject to the same dynamical principles, and follow the same trajec-
tories. This is a typical classical limit situation, in which the predictions
made by quantum mechanics should parallel those of classical mechanics. In
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particular, in the experiment with the unusual membranes of section 3 we
should expect that quantum mechanics gives us the result we derived there,
namely the existence, in principle, of an entropy of mixing with the value
2kN log 2. In the limiting situation everything goes, according to quantum
mechanics, as in the classical case and the earlier derivations can be repeated
step by step.
Apparently then, the quantum mechanical symmetrization postulates are
not decisive for the question of whether or not particles are distinguishable
in quantum mechanics! In the diluted gas situation that we just discussed
quantum particles are as distinguishable as classical particles: they occupy
different spatial positions and follow continuous and non-intersecting trajec-
tories. In this case it is clear that real physical differences correspond to
different trajectories and different particle origins, and the existence of an
entropy of mixing testifies to this: the differences in question give rise to
empirical effects. Nevertheless and paradoxically, in this very same situation
the symmetrization postulates are fully respected.
The situation becomes clearer when we consider a concrete case, namely a
two-particle quantum system in which the one-particle wave functions do not
overlap spatially, like in the diluted gas just discussed. Take as the quantum
state of the system
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|φ1〉|ψ2〉+ |ψ1〉|φ2〉), (2)
with |φ〉 and |ψ〉 representing two non-overlapping wave packets. This state
is symmetrical: exchange of the indices 1 and 2 leaves the state invariant, and
there is thus no physical difference associated with the distinction between
these indices. Still, this symmetrical state represents a situation in which
there are two quasi-classical objects, one at the position of the wave packet
represented by |φ〉 and one at the position of |ψ〉. These wave packets and
the objects they represent clearly are distinguishable, and they are the things
that are relevant for the classical limit. As was illustrated above for the
diluted gases case, these spatially non-overlapping wave packets take the role
of particles in the classical limit.
Summarizing, although it is true that because of the symmetrization each
index in an N -particles quantum state of particles of the same kind,
|Ψ〉 = 1√
N !
∑
Π|φi1〉|ψi2〉|χi3〉|τi4〉 · · · (3)
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—where Π denotes permutation over the indices and the summation is taken
over all such permutations—is associated with exactly the same “state” (in
the sense of a density operator obtained by partial tracing), there still will
be distinguishable particles in the classical limit if the one-particle states
|φ〉, |ψ〉, |χ〉, |τ〉 · · · do not spatially overlap. Therefore, the indices in the
quantum mechanical formalism, over which (anti-)symmetrization takes place,
cannot refer to what we understand to be particles in classical physics!
This observation is the key to the resolution of our paradox. Although the
indices in the “many-particle” quantum formalism have completely symmet-
rical roles to play and do not correspond to any physical differences, this does
not entail that it does not make a difference if we exchange two particles in
the ordinary sense (i.e., the localized objects that we are wont to call particles
in classical physics). Therefore, there may be a mixing entropy even if the
symmetrization postulates are fully respected: the existence of this entropy
depends on the distinguishability of particles, not on the distinguishability
of indices. The notion that the symmetrization postulates enforce division
by N ! in the classical expression for the entropy, and thus make the entropy
of mixing vanish for gases of the same kind, rests on a confusion about the
status of the particle concept in quantum mechanics [5, 7].
5 How Particles Are To Be Represented in
Quantum Mechanics
Elaborating on this conclusion, it should be noted that the symmetrization
postulates, which are responsible for the physical equivalence of all indices
in states of many particles of the same kind, are basic postulates of quantum
mechanics; they possess a universal validity. This implies that if we were
to take the indices to refer to particles, it would follow that all particles of
the same kind in the universe are in exactly the same state. For example,
it would not make sense to distinguish between electrons here and electrons
elsewhere, for instance in another solar system: all electrons in the universe
are “partly here, partly there, a bit everywhere”. The applicability of the
symmetry postulates holds regardless of what kinds of interactions and situ-
ations are considered; in particular, whatever circumstances should turn out
to be responsible for the transition to the classical limit, these do not affect
the applicability of the postulates. Therefore, if we were to assume that the
quantum indices refer to particles, this would imply that even in the classical
limit particles are all in exactly the same state—that even classical particles
are completely indistinguishable!
This simple reductio shows once again how wrong it is to think that the
symmetrization in quantum mechanics pertains to particles in the ordinary
sense. Classical particles are certainly distinguishable objects, so they simply
cannot correspond to the quantum indices in the classical limit.
Classical particles are characterized by their unique spatial positions and
trajectories. Now, as a defence of the idea that the individuality that cor-
responds with these individuating features disappears as soon as quantum
mechanics is taken into account, it is sometimes maintained that the “hazi-
ness” of quantum mechanical wave functions, in the sense of their non-zero
spatial extensions, makes it impossible to follow a quantum particle in all
detail over time (e.g., [1]). For this reason precise trajectories do not exist in
quantum mechanics and the concept of genidentity, so the argument contin-
ues, cannot apply to quantum particles: their wave packets will overlap, and
we can consequently not find out where each particle comes from and with
which earlier particle it should be considered identical.
This argument is notable for at least two reasons. First, it apparently
assumes that particles can be associated with individual wave packets (that
may overlap). This betrays a correct intuition about what particles are and
how they are to be represented in the quantum formalism, but is of course
in conflict with the standard idea that the indices in the formalism denote
particles. Second, this “haziness argument” is implausible as a general de-
fence of the indistinguishability of particles. This indistinguishability would
apparently have to occur as soon as there is overlap between wave packets;
but haziness is something gradual, subject to becoming more or less, and
evidently not strong enough a premiss to bear such an all-or-nothing conclu-
sion. Moreover, the (anti-)symmetrization postulates remain in force even if
wave packets do not overlap at all, which demonstrates that overlap cannot
be the decisive factor here.
What the haziness argument actually supports is our earlier conclusion
that particles in quantum mechanics should be represented by one-particle
wave packets, and that there is a gradual transition from the “classical”
situation, in which such wave packets are spatially disjoint, to the more
typical quantum case in which there is overlap and in which the classical
particle concept is not fully applicable. Our essential argument is that there
is no relation between the particle concept thus understood and the “particle
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indices” in the quantum mechanical formalism.
That quantum mechanics is indeed capable of representing classical parti-
cles in the way just explained, is (as we already mentioned earlier) guaranteed
by Ehrenfest’s theorem. In the case of a Hamiltonian H = p2/2m + V (r),
with p the momentum, m the particle mass and V (r) a potential field, we
can introduce a force field F (r) = −∇V (r), in terms of which Ehrenfest’s
theorem takes the form
〈F (r)〉 = m d
2
dt2
〈r〉. (4)
For certain specific potentials (in particular free motion, i.e. F=0, rele-
vant to our ideal gases case) we find that 〈F (r)〉 equals F (〈r〉), so that in
these cases the mean value of r exactly satisfies the classical law of motion
F (〈r〉) = m d2
dt2
〈r〉. In general this is not so. But if the wave function is
localized in a sufficiently small region of space, so that the variation of the
force field within that region is small, we can replace Eq. (4) by the classical
equation in a good approximation (which becomes better when the state be-
comes more localized). From this it follows that well-localized single-particle
quantum states (localized in the sense that their associated wave packets are
very narrow) approximately follow classical trajectories. Classical trajecto-
ries thus do exist in quantum mechanics: they are realized by (very) small
wave packets. Consequently it is essential, for the classical limit, to have a
mechanism that keeps wave packets narrow during appreciable time intervals.
Such considerations are standard in studies on the classical limit of quan-
tum mechanics, and there is growing agreement that the essential element
in explaining how classical mechanics emerges from quantum mechanics is
the process of decoherence. Decoherence processes cause the destruction of
coherence between parts of the wavefunction centered around different posi-
tions, and effectively reduce wave functions to narrow wave packets (see for
a more extensive discussion [5]).
It is generally acknowledged then that the classical limit of quantum
mechanics is characterized by the emergence of classical trajectories followed
by narrow wave packets. These narrow wave packets become the particles
we are familiar with in classical physics.
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6 Particles as Emergent Entities
Our conclusion is therefore that we should think of particles, as we know them
from classical physics, as represented in quantum mechanics by localized
wave packets [5, 7]. That is to say, if we encounter a state |Ψ〉 defined in
an n-fold tensor product Hilbert space H1 ⊗H2 ⊗H3 ⊗ ...⊗Hn, and wish
to investigate whether it can be interpreted in terms of particles, we have
to ask ourselves whether it can be written as a (anti-)symmetrized product
of localized one-particle states. It is easy to show that if such a “particle
decomposition” of |Ψ〉 exists, it is unique [5].
In most cases states will not allow a particle interpretation; think, for ex-
ample, of a state of the form (2) with two overlapping wave packets |φ〉 and
|ψ〉 (each defined in a connected region of space). The particle decomposi-
tion that we need, in terms of localized states that are non-overlapping (and
therefore mutually orthogonal) clearly does not exist in this case: of course
there does exist a bi-orthogonal Schmidt decomposition, but the states oc-
curring in it will be linear combinations of |φ〉 and |ψ〉 and will consequently
spatially overlap. An arbitrarily chosen quantum state will therefore not rep-
resent particles. We need special circumstances to make the particle concept
applicable. In this sense, the classical limit with its decoherence processes
makes classical particles emerge from the substrate of the quantum world.
It may be added that the circumstances that are responsible for the emer-
gence of classical particles at the same time justify the use of the statistics
that we expect for the case of independent individuals. Indeed, in the case
of spatially non-overlapping wave packets, in which our particle concept be-
comes applicable, both Fermi-Dirac and Bose-Einstein statistics reduce to
classical Boltzmann statistics [2, 6].
7 The Gibbs Paradox: Conclusion
When equal gases of the same pressure and temperature mix, nothing hap-
pens from a macroscopic, thermodynamical point of view. So there should be
no entropy of mixing in this case, in conformity with what thermodynamics
predicts. In the literature this vanishing of the thermodynamic mixing en-
tropy when two equal gases mix has often been interpreted as a fundamental
fact, as a sign that also on the level of statistical mechanics, when the mi-
croscopic constitution of the gases is taken into account, it should not make
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a physical difference whether gas particles originate from one or the other
of the initially separated gases. This interpretation is mistaken. When non-
thermodynamic, microscopic separation and mixing techniques are allowed,
it turns out that even in the case of equal gases the value 2kN log 2 of the
mixing entropy, and other effects of mixing, can be recovered and in principle
experimentally verified. The vanishing of the entropy of mixing is therefore
conditional on looking in a purely macroscopic way at what happens, and
has no consequences for the identity and distinguishability of microscopic
particles. Invoking quantum mechanics in order to argue that the mixing
entropy vanishes as a matter of principle, on account of the fundamental
indistinguishability of particles, is completely wrongheaded.
As it turns out, the microscopic effects of mixing classical gases of the
same kind persist in quantum mechanics. This becomes understandable once
we realize that the gas particles do not correspond to the indices in the quan-
tum formalism, but rather to one-particle wave packets. In the classical limit
such wave packets become the particles we know from classical mechanics.
The conclusion that quantum particles correspond to one-particle wave func-
tions rather than to indices accords with other evidence that these indices
have a purely mathematical significance and do not denote physical objects
[3, 4, 5]. According to our analysis of what particles are, the appearance of
particles constitutes a genuine case of emergence. Only if specific physical
conditions are satisfied, resulting in the presence of localized wave pack-
ets (decoherence processes are usually essential here) does the concept of a
particle in the ordinary sense become applicable to the world described by
quantum mechanics.
Finally, even in cases in which individual particles in our sense are not
present in the mixing gases of the Gibbs paradox, quantum mechanics pre-
dicts that a non-zero value of the entropy of mixing can be recovered by
using sophisticated membranes. The reason is that the two initially sep-
arated volumes of ideal gas are represented by mutually orthogonal wave
functions, located on the left and right, respectively. Since ideal gases do not
interact these wave functions remain orthogonal, and therefore distinguish-
able in principle, even after the removal of the partition. This point (to be
worked out elsewhere) demonstrates once more that the indistinguishability
of bosons and fermions is irrelevant to the resolution of the Gibbs paradox.
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